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Abstract 
 
In July 2007, the Prodi government and representatives of the three main Italian trade 
union confederations signed a landmark agreement on welfare and economic 
development. In October, in order to ratify or reject the agreement, the Italian labor 
movement organized a referendum, i.e. the Workers’ Referendum of 2007, inviting 
workers, pensioners and the unemployed to assess the agreement. Based on a 
comprehensive sampling (1,574 interviewees), these research notes provide an analysis of 
the Workers’ Referendum with regard to both key societal voting features and attitudes 
toward unions.  
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Introduction 
On July 23rd,  2007 the Prodi government and representatives of Italy’s three main 
trade union confederations (CGIL, CISL and UIL) signed a landmark ‘social protocol’ 
agreement on welfare and economic development (Protocollo su previdenza, lavoro e 
competitività, per l’equità e la crescita sostenibili). In October, in order to ratify or reject 
the agreement, CGIL, CISL and UIL organised a referendum (the so-called Referendum 
dei lavoratori) and invited workers, pensioners and the unemployed to assess the 
agreement.  
The turnout ratio was in itself cause for reflection. Beyond the percentage of 
voters in favour of the agreement struck by the government and the unions – about 80 per 
cent of voters – what drew scholars’ attention was the high turnout: more than five 
million workers, pensioners and job-seekers voted (Carrieri, 2008: 10). As suggested by 
Accornero (2007), the very complexity of the issues covered by the Protocollo – social 
protection, economic development, labour policy, government spending and taxation – 
might have had a negative effect on turnout rates. Nonetheless, the referendum drew a 
large turnout and represented a milestone in terms of union democracy.  
A vast majority of voters approved the agreement. This is the reason why the 
Protocollo between the Prodi government and the trade union confederations achieved a 
clear political result: albeit with some notable exceptions (basically metalworkers 
affiliated with FIOM-CGIL), we can say that the agreement was accepted. Indeed, 
turnout rates were in sharp contrast to the idea that an extremely segmented labour 
market, as is Italy’s, with its multiple levels (gender, age, types of employment contracts, 
economic sectors and geographical specificities), and a Gini index above the EU average, 
would lead to a different result in terms of participation and voting (Carbonai and Pedaci, 
2009). According to the official summary report, the vote was unanimous and evenly 
distributed across regions, social groups and economic sectors (all professional groups 
with the exception of steel industry workers).  
Foremost, the 2007 workers’ referendum was a clear episode of unity between 
CGIL, CISL and UIL.  However, after the May 2008 crisis of the Prodi government, the 
Italian labour movement split again, especially during the last Berlusconi government, 
which extended until November 2008. In Italy, periods of closer union cooperation have 
been always followed by periods of greater coldness, if not outright hostility (Accornero, 
1992). After the referendum, relations between the confederations were once again 
marked by differences, and the prospect of organizational unity seemed distant (Leonardi, 
2010). However, in 2013, the trade union setting was further rattled by the political and 
institutional crisis submerged after February’s general elections. This, in turn, practically 
forced a Union agreement (June 2013) on representation rules and led to renewed pledges 
of trade union unity. 
Loyalty to the union and activism are expected to result from effective mobilising. 
Unions adopting a mobilising strategy expect to develop collectivism in their 
membership so that, in the future, loyal, active members would encourage other workers 
to take part in the struggle (Cregan et al., 2009). Thus, what were the outcomes of a 
referendum that drew over five million people and which represented an extraordinary 
moment of trade union unity, participation and democracy? Surely, demand for political 
participation had been rising in Italy over the previous years (Venturino, 2007). Besides 
arguably having partially met this demand for social participation, the referendum was 
also a response to an internal trade union demand of resorting to an external, democratic 
and participatory mechanism in order to legitimate the trade union as a collective actor 
and to reconfigure trade union divisions. Ultimately, however, the referendum was only 
partly successful both because the pro-labour Romano Prodi government remained in 
office for just about two years (May 2006– May 2008) and because the trade unions 
remained divided, thus fragmenting political and trade union representation, as they 
continued to lose membership (Bellardi et al., 2010; Baccaro and Howell, 2012).  These 
critical elements of Italian trade union system may be encountered in this article.  
In general, research into trade union participation and democracy is focused on 
company-related cases (Hammer, 1998: 143; Snape and Redman, 2012). The purpose of 
this survey-based research is to establish a solid base of data from which to draw 
conclusions and make interpretations of current critical evidence of trade union and 
industrial democracy in Italy, outside the realm of the enterprise. In line with other 
general trends (Gahan, 2012), the data analysed provides critical elements concerning 
institutional trust in the trade union: i.e. its capacity to represent certain professional 
categories, and simultaneously accomplishing inclusion that reaches beyond unionized 
workers. This probably reflects a shift in Italy from a sense of social community – e.g., 
expressed by the Union memberships – to a more fragmented society. 
 
Does a workers’ referendum reduce fragmentation? 
With regard to comparative cases in Europe, the use of referendums is rare in 
Germany, Austria and Belgium, where unions are formed by representative bodies of all 
workers. In the Netherlands, in contrast, referendums are increasingly popular (Baccaro 
and Carrieri, 2011). Generally speaking, this practice is used to legitimise the outcome of 
collective deals, especially those involving political issues (Poole et al., 2001). The 
Italian case falls in this category.  
On May 20th, 1970 the Italian Parliament adopted Law no. 300, the so-called 
“Workers Statute”, introducing in Article 21 the “trade union referendum”. According to 
this provision, unions can organise referendums on trade union issues, involving the 
workforce of a single enterprise, an economic sector or even the entire labour force, also, 
in order to legitimise agreements centralised by the government and the employers.  
Union democracy gained momentum in 1988, when the three Italian 
metalworkers’ unions submitted a joint bargaining agenda regarding a threshold 
agreement and a national referendum. Or in 1995, when the main trade union 
confederations launched a national “trade union referendum”, through which Italian 
workers approved a critical reform of the pension system as proposed by the Dini 
government. Still, the referendum of October 2007 showed a higher turnout rate in 
comparison with the 1995 referendum, with 5,128,507 votes cast in 2007 against 
3,786,586 in the 1995 referendum.  
The geography of the 2007 vote highlights some elements of discontinuity with 
respect to the referendum of 1995. In 2007 the total number of voters in the southern 
regions of Italy increased (e.g. in Sicily, voters increased by 462,598 and in Campania by 
more than 300,000 voters compared to 1995). On the whole the vote appeared 
homogeneous. However, among metalworkers levels of approval were below average, 
although slightly above 50% of them were in favour of the agreement. 
A referendum on collective bargaining system was once again held in 2009, yet 
this time only by the trade union confederation CGIL. In Italy, collective bargaining in 
the private sector primarily takes place at two levels – industry level and company level 
(i.e. after the national-level agreement between employers, unions and government of 
July 1993, which radically reformed the system of collective bargaining). This bargaining 
framework has come under pressure in recent years. Changes to the system, agreed upon 
by CISL and UIL but not by CGIL in January 2009, altered the balance between 
confederations and divided unions. In 2009, employers’ association Confindustria called 
for bargaining to be more decentralised and for company level bargaining to be assigned 
more importance. These issues were discussed by the three confederations in an attempt 
to reach a compromise, but to no avail. Hence, CISL and UIL decided to act without 
CGIL and, in January 2009 and with the support of UGL too, signed a framework 
agreement with the employers and the government on a new system of collective 
bargaining (Accordo Quadro governo-sindacati di riforma degli assetti contrattuali). In 
April 2009, this was followed by a more detailed agreement specifying the rules for the 
new system in the industrial sector. CGIL refused to sign either agreement and did not 
recognize the new system. In March 2009, CGIL organised a referendum on the new 
arrangements of the government-labour framework agreement, with 3.4 million out of the 
3.6 million workers and pensioners’ constituency voting against it. Ultimately, the 
referendum retained its ratifying function yet lost its aggregative nature. 
 
 
Data on and Statistical Analysis of the Workers’ Referendum of 2007 
The most interesting issues regarding the Workers’ Referendum are not related to 
who won but to issues such as why people voted the way they did or the implications of 
the results. These questions are not always easily answered. Surely, just looking only at 
campaign events and incidents will not suffice.  
In accordance with the constituency of the referendum, the sampled population is 
composed of workers, retirees and jobless people entitled to vote. The survey was 
conducted in April 2008 and included 1,574 randomly selected voters and non-voters, in 
a constituency of workers, jobless people and pensioners (1). The data can be considered 
a representative sample of the relevant population. The sample data was collected by the 
SWG institute and commissioned by CGIL. The sample is composed of quotas extracted 
from lists of names provided by the phone book of the entire national network. A random 
probability sampling method is used, stratified into four levels: 1. sex; 2. geographical 
area; 3. demographic size of the town; 4. professional status. 
Among those who declared they were informed about the content of the social 
pact (54% were “informed” or “very informed”), 33.9% of the respondents decided to 
vote. Among workers, propensity to vote is generally higher than for pensioners: 40.6% 
of the workers decided to vote, while 22.52% of the retirees voted (Table 1). 
Table 1 – Vote and employment status (percentages and standard residuals) 
 N 
Did you vote at the Workers’ Referendum of 2007? 
Total 
Yes No  
Active workers 983 40.69%* 59.31%** 100% 
Retired workers 564 22.52%** 77.48%* 100% 
Unemployed 27 25.93% 74.07% 100% 
Total 1,574 33.93% 66.07% 100% 
* Standard residual over 2 (strong positive association between categories)  
** Standard residual less than -2 (strong negative association between categories) 
Pearson Chi-Square = 53.59 
 
Union membership is an important factor in understanding turnout statistics 
(Table 2). Clear differences can be seen across “union members” (or, otherwise, “anyone 
who is considering becoming a member”) and those who, in contrast, assume an attitude 
of “rejection/opposition” to unions (“No, I do not wish to become a member”). About 
half of the members chose to vote (48% among those who were not members but were 
“considering becoming a member”). This percentage decreases to 23.97% among non-
member workers who had no intention of becoming members in the future (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 – Membership and voting attitude (percentages of vote and standard residuals) 
 N 
Did you vote at the Workers’ 
Referendum of 2007? 
Total 
Yes No 
Are you currently a union 
member? 
Yes 448 50.22%* 49.78%** 100% 
No, but I was in the past 372 48.96%* 51.04% 100% 
No, but  thinking of becoming  96 27.96%** 72.04% 100% 
No, and do not intend to become  609 23.97%** 76.03%* 100% 
I prefer not to answer 49 24.49% 75.51% 100% 
Total 1,574 33.93% 66.07% 100% 
* Standard residual over 2 (strong positive association) 
** Standard residual less than -2 (strong negative association) 
Pearson Chi-Square = 97.52 
 
Typically, there are no significant differences between public employees and 
private sector workers. But private sector workers’ turnout is above average. The 
percentage of voters among teachers (30%), however, is significantly lower than the 
mean values (41.48%). 
If we take into consideration just the voters (534 respondents), 54.3% of them 
voted in favour of the agreement; 26.4% voted against the deal; 4.9% voted blank; and 
the others (14.4%) preferred not to answer. This is a population that had already 
developed strong convictions regarding voting choices: only 11% of those who claim to 
have voted in favour of the agreement changed their minds within the period between the 
signing of the agreement and the referendum in October. This “rigidity” of opinion can be 
observed for both votes in favour and against the agreement. Union membership is a 
determinant of the vote (Table 3). Considering only the subset of voters, 68.89% of union 
members voted in favour of the agreement. Among those who would like to join a union 
(“No, but I’m thinking of becoming a member”) the propensity to vote in favour is higher 
than the sample average (and equal to 57.45%). Among those who had been members in 
the past, propensity drops to 48.08%. 
 
Table 3 – Vote and union membership 
 N 
Did you vote in favour or against 
the agreement? 
Total 
In favour Against 
Blank ( null) 
vote 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Are you 
currently 
a union 
member? 
Yes 225 68.89%* 22.67% 1.33%** 7.11%** 100% 
No, but I was in the past 104 48.08% 35.58%* 2.88% 13.46% 100% 
No, but I'm thinking of 
becoming a member 
47 57.45% 19.15% 6.38% 17.02% 100% 
No, and I don’t intend to 
become a member 
146 36.99%** 29.45% 10.96% 22.60% 100% 
I prefer not to answer 12 33.33% 8.33% 8.33% 50.00% 100% 
Total 534 54.31% 26.40% 4.87% 14.42% 100% 
* Standard residuals over 2 (strong positive association) 
** Standard residuals less than -2 (strong negative association) 
Pearson Chi-Square = 70.30 
 
Excluding those who did not turn out to vote yet would have nullified their votes, 
it is possible to categorize the sampled population according to a criterion of general 
“attitude towards the agreement of July 2007” into four types of attitude (Table 4). 
Table 4 – A typology of vote and attitudes towards the Workers’ Referendum 
 
 Typology n % Type Characteristics 
1. In favour 290 19.72% Turned out for Referendum and voted in favour 
2. Free-riders 318 21.62% 
Did not participate in the vote but declared to be in favour of the 
agreement 
3. 
Against the 
referendum  
377 25.63% 
Against (a): turned out for the Referendum and voted against the 
agreement (141 votes against the agreement); Against (b): did not 
turn out for the Referendum but declared their opposition to the 
agreement (236 against who did not vote) 
4. Indifferent 486 33.03% Neither voted nor have an opinion on the agreement  
Total 1,471 100%  
 
The propensity of men to free-ride is substantially higher than that of women 
(27% of men versus 12% of women). While among men the proportion of those who are 
“indifferent” to the agreement is 24.64%, among women this percentage grows to 
46.32%. Those who are most “indifferent” towards the agreement are those employed 
(42% of employees versus an average of 33%), mainly workers in small firms.  
The typology proposed herein is also associated with union membership. Union 
members’ propensity to be in favour of the agreement is substantially higher than the 
sample’s average (36.3% versus 20.25%). In contrast, ex-members and free-riders 
showed a higher propensity to be against the agreement (Table 5). 
Table 5 – Cross tabulation: “Union membership” by “attitudes toward the agreement” 
 
 N 
In 
favour 
Free 
riders 
Against 
(voters 
Indifferent Total 
and 
non- 
voters) 
Are you 
currently a 
union 
member? 
Yes 427 
36.3%* 20.1% 26.5% 17.1%** 
100% 
No, but I was in the past 351 
14.2%** 29.3%* 32.8% 23.6%** 
100% 
No, but I'm thinking of becoming a 
member 
85 
31.8%* 10.6%** 21.2% 36.5% 
100% 
No, and I don’t intend to become a 
member 
550 
9.8%** 20.4% 27.8% 42.0%* 
100% 
 
Total 1,413 20.25 21.93 28.24 29.58 100% 
* Standard residuals over 2 (strong positive association) 
** Standard residuals less than -2 (strong negative association) 
Pearson Chi-Square = 181.29 
 
What is worth stressing is that the level of trust in Italian trade unions overall is 
low, both among those in favour and those against the referendum. 40.4% of the 
respondents believe unions have become self-serving; added to the 23.9% who think 
trade unions ought to reorganize themselves, nearly two out of every three respondents 
are, indeed, criticising labour. This critical area for Italian labour does not only involve 
those against the Workers’ Referendum. For example, 17% of those in favour of the 
referendum (Table 6) believe trade unions have become self-serving (27% of the free-
riders). 
Table 6 – Cross tabulation “In your opinion do trade unions in Italy play a role [...]” by 
“typology of voter”  
 
 
N 
“Indispensable” + 
“important” 
“Unions are self-
serving” 
“Don’t know” Total 
In favour 290 82.06%* 17.24%** 0.60% 100% 
Free riders 318 70.75* 27.04** 2.2% 100% 
Against 403 41.68%** 56.82%* 1.48% 100% 
Undecided 435 44.59** 50.57* 4.82* 100% 
Total 1,446 5705% 40.45% 2.48% 100% 
* Standard residuals over 2 (strong positive association) 
** Standard residuals less than -2 (strong negative association) 
Pearson Chi-Square = 176.29 
 
 
This area also spans over union membership. For instance, one in every four 
members believes the unions are self-serving (Table 7).  
 Table 7 – Cross tabulation: “Union’s membership” by “In your opinion, do Italian trade 
unions fulfil the role [...]”  
 
 N 
«Indispensable» 
+ «Important» 
«Unions 
are self-
serving» 
«Don’t 
know» 
Total 
Are you 
currently 
member of a 
Union? 
Yes 448 
72.8%* 26.1%** 1.1% 
100% 
No, but I was union 
member in the past 
372 
57.5% 41.1% 1.3% 
100% 
No, but I am going to 
become a Union member 
96 
82.3%* 12.5%** 5.2% 
100% 
No, I won’t become a 
Union member 
609 
39.6%** 56.5%* 3.9% 
100% 
 
I prefer don’t answer 49 
49% 30.6% 20.4* 
100% 
 
Total 1,574 56.2% 641 28.24 100% 
* Standard residuals over 2 (strong positive association) 
** Standard residuals less than -2 (strong negative association) 
Pearson Chi-Square=203.98 
 
 
Decommodified (but inclusive) bargaining 
Often, the debate on union revitalization also involves re-thinking bargaining 
models and forms of participation. First, the structure of collective bargaining, ranging 
from comprehensive to more fragmented systems, affects labour’s bargaining power and 
goals. Because of worker participation, referendums and similar forms represent an 
attempt – especially in the case of the Workers’ Referendum of 2007 – at inclusive 
bargaining. In 2007, Italian Unions were in need of an instrument of industrial 
democracy. So, whereas in 1995 the role of the trade unions was limited to “calling-to-
vote”, in 2007 the unions held thousands of meetings and debates in which the Protocollo 
was carefully explained and discussed with the workers. In this sense, the referendum 
should not be viewed as a simple count used to settle internal disputes, but as 
encouraging debate, discussion, consideration of the long-term consequences of the 
decision, as well as a “school of democracy” (Cohen and Rogers, 1992). 
Second, because of direct participation, referendums tip the balance between 
bureaucracy – in favour of internal democracy – and the relationship with and between 
union members.  
According to Baccaro (2007), the adoption of these procedures may strengthen the 
capacity of unions to engage and influence governmental policies, through aggregative 
(referendum) and deliberative mechanisms (assessment of social protocol). Moreover, the 
mutated character of the political negotiation – in particular the decline of the amount of 
resources for political exchange (decommodifying) – forces unions to invest much more 
in inclusive procedures, such as workers’ referendums, in which the decisions of the 
union leaders are discussed and expressly authorized by the workers, the rank-and-file 
(Baccaro, 2007, 2008). A trade-off is assumed between contractual counterparts and 
democratic procedures: the scarcer the counterparts, the bigger the investment in 
democratic processes of legitimation. Unlike hierarchical control, union democracy 
promotes inclusive bargaining and assures political legitimacy – even in the absence of 
material incentives, union members accept collective choice (Baccaro, 2008: 63). Also, a 
referendum can be even more important, especially when the general levels of trust 
expressed to the union are low (such as data suggested). 
Since the 1990s collective bargaining has steadily become less concessive in Italy. 
Over the last twenty years labour’s political agenda in Italy has been challenged by wage 
containment policies, restricted access to welfare benefits, the introduction of various 
forms of flexible work, the lowering of social protection standards. From this point of 
view, the referendum supports the union leadership in mobilising consensus on unpopular 
choices and strengthens perceived legitimacy. In fact, when bargaining is acquisitive, 
legitimacy is generally based on the resources acquired. In contrast, especially with the 
decline of the amount of resources available for political exchange, legitimacy is based 
on “discursive democracy”, a form of democracy in which deliberation is central to 
decision making (Baccaro, 2011). 
The electorate body was extended to include all workers, not just union members, 
in accordance with the spirit of the Protocollo. Most importantly, the constituency of the 
referendum and the audience, i.e. those who are affected by the agreement, matched one 
another. Pensioners were included in the electorate; however, none of the agreements on 
pension reform over the last 15 years has changed the actual conditions of Italian 
pensioners. Because they were not part of the affected interests, their right to participate 
in the decision-making process did not seem to be fully justified. In contrast, including 
students and young people who were unable to vote in July 2007 in the electorate body is 
justified, since the agreement would, albeit not immediately, be applicable to them. It is 
possible this would have had an effect on the results of the vote. Anyway, the results 
show that a wide part of Italian society – including unionized workers, students and 
young people too – demand political and social participation, but it might express a deep 
disagreement with Unions, even if in favor of Social Protocol. 
 
The short-term effect of Workers’ Referendum  
In Italy, over the period 2005–2011, the demand for social participation by 
workers and left-leaning electorate is generally increasing. In 2005, in the primary 
election of centre-left electoral alliance Unione, the total count is in excess of 4.3 million 
voters (Venturino, 2007). Two years later, in October 2007, voters of the Democratic 
Party were called to choose the party leader, among their representatives at the 
Constituent Assembly: more than 3.5 million voters. Similarly, the Workers’ Referendum 
of October 2007 and a new one in March 2009: when CGIL organised a new referendum 
on the new arrangements of the government-labour framework agreement (about 3.6 
million voters). Of note was the case of Popolo Viola [Purple People], a protest 
movement originated in 2009; using a network of Facebook pages, the Popolo Viola 
created a connection among large groups of people, coming from different Italian regions 
and varied social layers. Finally, from 2010 to 2011, students protested frequently and 
intensively – e.g. the Global Day of Action on October 2011th in Rome – against what 
they consider as attacks on public education, such as budget cuts and increased levels of 
tuition fees.    
In 2012, the number of protests – and social demand of political participation – is 
reduced when compared to the period 2005-2011. Italians unions and left parties do not 
aggregate this demand. Nevertheless, in order to grow, protests and social demands need 
political opportunities. The creation of potential allies – e.g. left-parties and unions – 
becomes a necessity, both strategic and fundamental: such allies are important to broaden 
the mobilisation, for the logistic resources they can offer, and, even more, to increase the 
political influence of the protest. However the Monti’s government grand coalition (from 
November 2011 to April 2013) drastically reduced this opportunity. In this period, 
political parties – and indirectly unions, because of the historical linkage with the party 
system1 – support the neoliberal government in the Italian parliament: they would not be 
credible allies for those who are opposing Mario Monti’s policies.  
The Italian general election of February 2013 saw the ascent of Beppe Grillo and 
the success of M5S MoVimento 5 Stelle (M5S) [Five Star Movement] also as a result of 
this lack of social approval. In 2005 Beppe Grillo created the blog beppegrillo.it which 
immediately showed a remarkable success. Since then, this success has been rapidly 
increasing. In 2008, the Observer ranked “beppegrillo.it” as the ninth world’s most 
influential blogs. Then, followers began to organise themselves independently through 
the beppegrillo.meetup.com platform. If on the one hand, the (more or less) relatively 
institutionalized social demands of participation was reducing, on the other hand, Beppe 
Grillo was growing both in the new media, among followers (through the blog 
beppegrillo.it), regular political demostrations (e.g., the Vaffanculo day, in 2007), among 
people (the Tsunami Tour, in 2013).  
Grillo’s constituency is of a very heterogeneous social composition. M5S was 
particularly successful with the middle and upper middle classes, large sections of 
working class – typically identified with the “left” – young people (Tronconi, 2013). 
Those people are identified by Grillo as one of two social blocks existing in Italy2. M5S’ 
160 senators and parliamentarians mostly hail from this milieu and social block: young 
postgraduate and anti-establishment people, but also novices of the political arena, 
without a well-defined political identity. 
In Beppe Grillo’s language and rhetoric there is also a quite strong criticism 
towards the Italian unions. For example, during the Tsunami Tour for the 2013 electoral 
campaign, Grillo went so far as to propose the elimination of the unions because of a 
structure «as old as the political parties». With one exception: the Fiom-CGIL (the Trade 
Union for the metal industry’s labourers and office workers in Italy). His blog 
(beppegrillo.it) reserves quite appreciation for the Fiom-CGIL: the only trade union 
organization who supported the “No” at the Workers’ Referendum of 2007. For example, 
in 11th Jenuary 2011 Grillo’s blog posted: «the Fiom is not just defending the Mirafiori 
workers. It is defending the Constitution, the democracy, and the freedom of choice. It is 
basically defending the possibility of giving a future for our country, that seems to us to 
be getting ever more distant». The General Secretary of the Fiom-CGIL Maurizio 
                                                             
1 In order to exemplify, Guglielmo Epifani, appointed Secretary of the Democratic Party (PD) in 2013, was 
the General Secretary of the CGIL from 2002 to 2010. 
2 In a blog post on 26th February 2013, Beppe Grillo claims that in Italy there are “two social blocks.” 
Block A, which voted for M5S, was made up “of millions of youth without a future”, including “the 
excluded, the over-taxed, […]” and a Block B that consists “of those who want to maintain the status 
quo […]”. 
Landini also appeared in a video message on the blog (on 29th March, 2012). Although a 
clear and defined proposal on industrial relations in Italy has never been present in the 
M5S, Beppe Grillo’s discourse and rhetoric points out the critical juncture of the union 
system in Italy.  
 
 
Notes 
(1) For a description of sample, see Carbonai (2010). 
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